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Project Suspensions and Failures in New Product
Development: Returns for Entrepreneurial Firms in
Co-Development Alliances
Yansong Hu, Peter McNamara, and Dorota Piaskowska
Entrepreneurial biotech and large pharmaceutical firms often form alliances to co-develop new products. Yet, new
product development (NPD) is fraught with challenges that often result in project suspensions and failures. Con-
sidering this, how can firms increase the chances that their co-development alliances will create value? To answer
this question, the authors build on insights from signaling theory to argue that prior project suspensions provide
positive signals leading to an increase in value creation, while project failures have the opposite effect. In addi-
tion, drawing on insights from temporal construal theory, this research predicts that the strength of these effects
is contingent on the stage along the exploration–exploitation continuum at which the alliance is formed. The
authors undertook event study analyses of 248 alliances formed by 104 biotechnology firms from the United States
and Europe listed on eight stock exchanges over an 8-year period between 1996 and 2003. The results confirm
that prior NPD project suspensions have a stronger value creation effect (or prior failures have a weaker value
destruction effect) in the case of exploration alliances in the upstream of NPD processes than in the case of
moderate-scale exploitation alliances in the downstream of NPD. This study is among the first to examine how
both prior NPD project suspensions and failures of firms affect the abnormal returns achieved from co-
development alliances. This research therefore contributes to the innovation literature by honing a better under-
standing of setbacks and failures in NPD. Moreover, the findings contribute to the literature on strategic alliances
by identifying new conditions under which firms can create or preserve value. This research also contributes to
signaling theory by providing evidence of the moderation effect caused by the signaling environment. Finally, this
study contributes to the entrepreneurial literature on value creation for entrepreneurial firms in alliances follow-
ing adverse events.
Practitioner Points
 Managers should be aware that signaling suspen-
sions and failures to investors can influence their
expectations of future NPD performance and conse-
quently impact shareholder value created through
subsequent NPD alliances.
 Proactive portfolio management, including de-
prioritization of existing projects while allocating
and re-allocating resources to active projects, can
send out positive signals to investors to create better
value in NPD alliances.
 For those firms planning to build a culture of toler-
ance toward failure, entering co-development alli-
ances may be more desirable at exploratory stages
of the NPD process than later on.
Introduction
I
n high-tech industries, entrepreneurial firms are a
driving force for innovation. Yet, they may lack
the critical resources and capabilities required to
exploit their inventions. These firms often form co-
development alliances with large, incumbent firms to
access complementary assets and capabilities that are
necessary to develop and commercialize inventions in
their NPD process (Fang, 2008; Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004; Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch, 2004).
Prior research has shown that such alliances enhance
an entrepreneurial firm’s product innovation (George,
Zahra, and Wood, 2002; Kelley and Rice, 2002), and
provide opportunities for inter-organizational learning
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that boost the firm’s commercialization abilities (Grant
and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Holmqvist, 2003).
At the same time, prior research has recognized
that both alliances and NPD projects are difficult tasks
for managers (Emden, Calantone, and Droge, 2006;
Henard and Szymanski, 2001; Montoya-Weiss and
Calantone, 1994). Alliances are fraught with problems,
ranging from partner selection (Emden et al., 2006) to
how best to manage the alliance to create value for the
partners (Yang, Zheng, and Zhao, 2014). In particular,
entrepreneurial firms are difficult to evaluate for
investors and alliance partners alike because they lack
a performance track record or even previous revenues
(Shane and Stuart, 2002). Therefore, in evaluating an
entrepreneurial firm, investors have to rely on observ-
able attributes or “signals” to assess the unobserved
quality of a firm’s technology and NPD projects
(Stuart, Hoang, and Hybel, 1999), such as a prestigious
board of directors (Certo, Daily, and Dalton, 2001;
Spence, 1973). Furthermore, as many as three out of
four NPD projects fail (Cooper, 1990), and setbacks
and dead ends are commonplace (Van de Ven, Polley,
Garud, and Venkataraman, 1999). These may arise due
to a range of issues associated with the NPD process,
firm strategy, culture, resources, and commitment
(Barczak, Griffin, and Kahn, 2009; see, e.g., Henard
and Szymanski, 2001, and Montoya-Weiss and
Calantone, 1994, for reviews). Managers may thus ask
a key question: bearing in mind the inherent difficul-
ties of co-developing new products in alliances, how
can entrepreneurial firms manage the tasks involved in
creating value?
Prior research has indicated that entrepreneurial
firms’ ability to weather adverse events such as NPD
withdrawals depends on the stock of projects in the
NPD pipeline, alliance partners, and the firms’ ability
to work with them (Baron, 2000; De Carolis, Yang,
Deeds, and Nelling, 2009; Hoang and Rothaermel,
2005). While this last factor has been well documented
in prior research, comparatively little is known about
the impact of past NPD setbacks on entrepreneurial
firms’ ability to create value with new co-development
alliances. Yet, the experience of NPD setbacks is a
commonplace aspect of the innovation journey for
many entrepreneurial firms. During their NPD proc-
esses, entrepreneurial firms deal with projects which
fail to pass screening gates and are abandoned, as well
as ones which are put on hold if the timing is not right
or there are other, better projects that require the same
resources (Cooper, 2008). While some projects may be
pursued at a later date when the prioritization and tim-
ing issues are resolved (Cooper and Edgett, 2012) and
may help to improve new product quality in the end
(McNally, Akdeniz, and Calantone, 2011), NPD set-
backs are costly (De Carolis et al., 2009) and may
negatively impact firm performance (Lokshin,
Hagedoorn, and Letterie, 2011). This indicates that dif-
ferent types of NPD setbacks have both positive and
negative performance consequences and signal differ-
ent abilities (or a lack of them) on the part of entrepre-
neurial firms. Therefore, prior NPD setbacks can be
important signals for investors when firms enter into
co-development alliances.
In this article, the authors consider the role played
by prior NPD setbacks in value creation through new
co-development alliances by (1) differentiating
between positive signals from prior project suspensions
and negative signals from prior project failures, and
(2) considering the strength of these effects. This
depends on the stage along the exploration–exploita-
tion continuum at which the alliance is formed, where
exploration is described as activities related to experi-
mentation with new alternatives, which yields distant
and uncertain returns, and exploitation involves the
refinement and extension of existing technologies,
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which yields returns that are closer and more predict-
able (March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
This research relies on signaling theory as a theo-
retical framework (Spence, 1973, 2002). A particular
challenge for investors seeking to assess the quality of
entrepreneurial firms is information asymmetry, which
is a serious issue when establishing new alliances. It is
argued that an entrepreneurial firm’s prior project sus-
pensions provide a positive signal to investors and
partners that it has robust and marketable ideas which
could be capitalized on with a new product co-
development alliance, leading to increased value crea-
tion. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms’ prior project
failures are negative signals reflecting their issues in
the technology portfolios; they may reduce these firms’
attractiveness and raise alliance costs for prospective
partners, thus exerting a negative effect on the firms’
ability to create value through such alliances.
Prior literature has suggested that the inter-
organizational signaling effects can be moderated by the
influence of the task environment (Sanders and Boivie,
2004). Therefore, this study further argues that they are
contingent on the signaling environment (Connelly,
Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel, 2011) of the alliance
announcement, and in particular the stage of NPD
(along the exploration–exploitation continuum) at which
the alliances are formed. This continuum starts with
upstream exploration activities, followed by downstream
exploitation activities (including moderate-scale and
large-scale exploitations). By drawing insights from con-
strual theory (Trope and Liberman, 2003), this research
hypothesizes that, for the signals of prior project suspen-
sions and failures, exploration alliances in the upstream
of NPD add more to the positive value creation of sus-
pensions (or do more to counter the value damage of
failures) than moderate-scale exploitation alliances in the
downstream of NPD. According to construal theory,
when investors evaluate the value of a firm in an exploi-
tation alliance pursuing downstream NPD activities, they
tend to focus on how likely the future NPD is to suc-
ceed. For moderate-scale, downstream exploitation alli-
ances, there is a very high failure rate before projects
can reach final commercialization, suggesting a high
level of uncertainty and risk (Heide and John, 1990);
investors thus tend to see prior project suspensions and
failures as being of less value at this stage. In contrast,
judging an entrepreneurial firm in an NPD alliance in
the upstream development stages of exploration, invest-
ors are less likely to focus on the feasibility of future
NPD success because the finalization of the development
process and the product’s market introduction are distant
in time. Instead, they will focus more on the desirability
of the exploration alliance (the value of a successful
new product launch), and their perception of its value
will thus be higher. These tendencies have been long
described in literature on the behavior of future opti-
mism, where people tend to harbor more positive
expectations of distant outcomes (Mitchell, Thompson,
Peterson, and Cronc, 1997; Trope and Liberman, 2003).
To test their hypotheses, the researchers collected
data on 248 NPD alliances formed by 104 biopharma-
ceutical firms over an 8-year period between 1996 and
2003 in eight stock exchanges in the United States and
Europe. This research adopted the alliance formation
event as the unit of analysis, and used a standard event
study methodology to capture value creation on new
alliance formation by measuring abnormal stock mar-
ket returns around the time of alliance announcement
(e.g., Gulati and Wang, 2003; Swaminathan and Moor-
man, 2009). The analyses support the hypotheses.
This article seeks to make several contributions to
the literature. First, this study is among the first to
examine how both prior NPD suspensions and failures
of firms affect the abnormal returns achieved from co-
development alliances. The findings contribute to the
innovation literature by honing a better understanding
of setbacks and failures in NPD (Barczak, 2014). NPD
is perceived to be “among the essential processes for
success, survival and renewal of organizations, particu-
larly for firms in either fast-paced or competitive mar-
kets” (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995, p. 344). It is
commonly acknowledged that NPD suspensions and
failures are frequent among high-technology firms.
Few extant studies have explored the issue of suspen-
sions and failures, and even fewer have related suspen-
sions and failures to the variance in performance
outcomes. In this study, the researchers unpack the
impact of prior suspensions and failures, and provide a
richer view of their different effects, which may sug-
gest mechanisms for promoting or preventing effective
learning and creating value (cf. Barczak, 2014).
Second, the findings also contribute to the literature
on strategic alliances by identifying the conditions in
which firms can create or preserve value (Merchant
and Schendel, 2000). Recent research has looked into
the different conditions of value creation in alliances,
including different past experiences of alliances, such
as general versus partner-specific experience (Gulati,
Lavie, and Singh, 2009), the strategic fit and industry
fit of the focal firm (Yamakawa, Yang, and Lin,
2011), and the size and type of partners in an alliance
(Yang et al., 2014). This study contributes to this
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literature by highlighting the collective impact of pro-
ject suspensions and failures on firms’ financial per-
formance in a critical innovation activity, namely co-
development alliances.
Third, this research also contributes to signaling
theory by providing evidence of the moderation effect
caused by the signaling environment (Lester, Certo,
Dalton, Dalton, and Cannella, 2006), which remains an
understudied area in the application of signaling theory
(Connelly et al., 2011). This study suggests that the
strength of signaling effects of prior suspensions and
failures is contingent on the changing signaling envi-
ronment along the exploration–exploitation continuum
on which the alliance is formed.
Finally, this study contributes to the entrepreneurial
literature on value creation for entrepreneurial firms in
alliances during adverse events (De Carolis et al.,
2009). It is well understood that adverse events have a
negative performance impact at the time of occurrence
(De Carolis et al., 2009), and there is also evidence
that failure experience can be learnt from, leading to
longer-term success (McNamara and Baden-Fuller,
1999). This study adds to this literature by demonstrat-
ing the circumstances in which the past setbacks of
entrepreneurial firms can create or reduce value long
after the adverse effect has occurred.
Literature Review
Project Suspension and Failure Defined
Innovation processes are characterized by multiple tem-
poral rhythms and experiences (Cooper, 2008; Garud,
Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013). This implies that
the management of NPD projects is complex to the
extent it requires temporal coordination (Cooper,
Edgett, and Kleinshmidt, 1998, 1999). It is also complex
because managers need to balance the sometimes-
conflicting tasks of maximizing expected economic
returns, minimizing potential risk, and maintaining
diversity in the NPD portfolio, all with limited resources
(Blau, Pekny, Varma, and Bunch, 2004). In addition,
uncertainty and constraints such as those resulting from
organizational structure or insufficient resources and
knowledge make NPD project management a challeng-
ing process, and managers need to monitor existing
projects constantly with a view of accelerating some of
them while killing, suspending, or deprioritizing others
to allocate or re-allocate resources to active projects
(Cooper et al., 1998, 1999).
To deal with such complexity, different temporal
coordination mechanisms have been developed, includ-
ing the stage-gate mechanism, in which “gates” are
positioned at places along the product development
process that are most beneficial to facilitating perform-
ance evaluation and enabling management to make
“go/kill/hold/recycle” decisions on the project (Cooper,
1990, 2008). A project can fail when objective per-
formance information indicates that the only rational
option is to cancel the project prior to its completion
because of technical failures or a violation of budget-
ary or time constraints (Cooper, 2003; Cooper and
Kleinschmidt, 1990). Where the decision is less clear-
cut, a project may be suspended, that is to say effec-
tively put on hold, for it potentially to continue at a
later date when the resource, prioritization, timing, and
technical issues have been resolved (Cooper and
Edgett, 2012).
It follows from the literature reviewed above that
there are two principal types of decision, which man-
agers can take when a project needs to be stopped at
any particular stage. First, the project can be “killed.”
Such project failure occurs when the project cannot
satisfy the screening criteria required to proceed fur-
ther and is evaluated as a poor investment (Cooper,
2003; Cooper and Edgett, 2012; Cooper and Kleinsch-
midt, 1990). Second, the project can be put on hold, or
suspended. In contrast to project failures, suspended
projects “pass” the screening gate (Cooper and Edgett,
2012, p. 53) but need to be paused for other reasons.
Therefore, on their own, suspended projects can be
good investments (Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt,
2002). In sum, the first critical difference between pro-
ject suspensions and failures is whether they pass the
screening criteria and are evaluated as having good
investment potential, all else being equal.
The second difference between project failures and
suspensions is that the possibility of restarting a failed
project which has been killed is low, while a sus-
pended project can be restarted more readily. A failed
project is typically stopped permanently. In contrast, a
typical reason why a project is suspended is because
the timing is not right or there are other, better proj-
ects that require the same resources. Suspended proj-
ects may continue at a later date when the resource
constraints and prioritization and timing issues have
been resolved (Cooper and Edgett, 2012); once the
resources become available, then, suspended projects
can be reactivated.
The resources can be obtained internally or come
from outside of the firm, in particular from a co-
4 J PROD INNOV MANAG
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development alliance. When a project is not viable due
to a lack of complementary assets (Brown, 1997), such
assets can come from external sources such as cus-
tomer ideas or alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004;
von Hippel, 1978). Similarly, knowledge can be
obtained both from within and outside firm boundaries
(Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008; Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). In particular,
research has shown that external knowledge accessed
from R&D alliance partners impacts NPD positively
(Deeds and Hill, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).
Associated with resource availability are timing
issues. For project suspensions, timing issues may be
resolved at a later date, and the same applies to prob-
lems with resources. Although there is no specification
on how long a project suspension may last (and techni-
cally a suspension can be put on hold permanently and
therefore becomes a failure), the literature implies that
suspension should be short term and temporary and
may vary across different projects and industries
(Cooper and Edgett, 2012; Cooper et al., 2002).
Importantly, what is put on hold at one point in time
may become viable later (Van de Ven et al., 1999). In
sum, the ability to reactivate a project when timing
issues are resolved and resources become available,
possibly from a co-development alliance partner, dis-
tinguishes suspended projects from failed projects.
Because of the two differentiating features of pro-
ject suspensions and failures, the former may signal to
outsiders that the focal firm has positive and market-
able ideas but lacks certain resources required to con-
tinue the projects. However, project failures may
signal problems (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrick,
2007).
Signaling Theory
Prior project suspensions and failures can be important
signals when an NPD alliance is announced (Spence,
1973, 2002). In the high-tech industries, investors face
significant risk when investing in entrepreneurial firms
because of the high level of uncertainty affecting these
firms. With their products still in the development
stage, they typically do not have a track record of suc-
cessful product launches and may not generate any
revenues (Shane and Stuart, 2002). In addition, they
have high technical and commercial failure rates
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). At the same time, there are
severe information asymmetries between entrepreneur-
ial firms and investors because the firms possess more
information about the quality of their technologies and
NPD projects than outside investors do (Shane and
Stuart, 2002). As a result, when evaluating an entre-
preneurial firm, investors have to rely on observable
attributes or “signals” (e.g., patent citations and out-
comes of prior NPD projects) to assess the unobserved
quality of the technology and NPD projects of the firm
(Stuart et al., 1999). In this article, prior project sus-
pensions and failures are conceptualized as useful
“signals” for investors evaluating the value-creation
potential of new co-development alliances in
particular.
To this end, signaling theory suggests that informa-
tion asymmetry problems are mitigated by signals con-
veying useful information (Spence, 1973, 2002).
Signaling theory is frequently cited in the entrepre-
neurship literature (Lester et al., 2006), marketing lit-
erature (Kirmani and Rao, 2000), and NPD literature
(Akdeniz, Calantone, and Voorhees, 2014). It describes
the process by which the signaler (the entrepreneurial
firm) sends a signal that is received by the receiver
(potential investors and alliance partners) within a cer-
tain signaling environment (Busenitz, Fiet, and
Moesel, 2005; Cohen and Dean, 2005). In this process,
signals and the signaling environment determine the
receiver’s evaluation of the signaler’s quality or value.
Signal
In the context of NPD alliances in drug discovery,
entrepreneurial firms are difficult to evaluate for
investors because they lack a performance track record
or even revenues (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Therefore,
such firms send signals to indicate their unobservable
quality and gain legitimacy (Rao, Chandy, and Prabhu,
2008). Such signals include having prestigious boards
of directors (Certo et al., 2001) or top managers
(Lester et al., 2006), maintaining resources such as
technology and patents (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Levi-
tas and McFadyen, 2009), and engaging in alliances
and NPD projects (Hoenig and Henkel, 2015; Rao, Lu,
and Ruekert, 1999). In line with signaling theory, all
of these can serve as signals as they have the follow-
ing features, namely, they are differentially costly to
obtain for ventures of different quality; are based on
distinctive, observable, and alterable characteristics;
and are irreversible in the short term (Janney and
Folta, 2003; Ozcan and Overby, 2008; Spence, 1973).
Following the prior literature (e.g., Certo et al.,
2001; Rao et al., 2008), two categories of signals used
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by entrepreneurial firms entering into NPD alliances
can be identified: internal signals, including historical,
scientific, market, and locational aspects of the firm,
and external signals, including alliances and partners
(Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Park and Mezias, 2005).
The most readily available signals are arguably his-
torical ones. Historical signals convey information about
the entrepreneurial firm’s past performance and techno-
logical capability and, by inference, its future prospects.
For example, the literature on technological path
dependencies suggests that past technology may lock a
firm in or out of certain technological trajectories (e.g.,
Dosi, 1988; Schilling, 1998). In a similar vein, Helfat
and Raubitschek (2000) argue that a firm’s product his-
tory limits its choices for future product structures.
When the firm forms an NPD alliance, its past technol-
ogies and products signal the alliance’s (and its prod-
ucts’) chances of success. Therefore, historical signals,
such as past performance, quality of patents, which
pharmaceutical firms use to appraise the prospects of
biotechnology firms (Rothaermel, 2002), and prior NPD
project suspensions and failures, gain a new meaning
for investors when the entrepreneurial firm announces a
new co-development alliance. These are important sig-
nals of the future value of the entrepreneurial firms.
Other internal signals include scientific, market, and
locational signals. Scientific signals convey informa-
tion that the entrepreneurial firm has the scientific
knowledge and capability needed to operate in the
industry successfully. An entrepreneurial firm may
send this signal by, for example, recruiting eminent
scientists to serve on its board (Certo et al., 2001).
Market signals may convey information that the
entrepreneurial firm has NPD projects targeting a siza-
ble market, which has the potential to deliver value to
its investors (Rao et al., 2008).
Finally, locational signals convey information that
the firm may derive a differential advantage from its
geographic location (Porter, 1998).
External signals, meanwhile, include alliances and
partners (Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Park and Mezias,
2005). NPD alliances have been argued to serve as
signals of the quality of an entrepreneurial firm’s tech-
nology (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Pisano, 1990) and
to legitimize the firm (Rao et al., 2008). In addition,
alliance partners are pathways for the exchange of
resources and signals that convey recognition and
legitimation to outsiders (Stuart, 2000).
Signaling Environment
Apart from their characteristics, the effectiveness of
internal and external signals also depends on the envi-
ronment in which the signals are received (Ilmola and
Kuusi, 2006). This signaling environment can affect
the extent to which signals reduce information asym-
metry and how receivers notice and interpret the sig-
nals (Lester et al., 2006). In particular, during inter-
organizational signaling, one might expect different
effects to arise from the influence of the task environ-
ment (Sanders and Boivie, 2004).
As illustrated in Figure 1, in the context of co-
development alliances in the pharmaceutical industry in
particular, the signaling environment has a number of
features which may vary at different stages of the NPD
process, including the major activities involved, the lev-
els of investment, and related risks and failure rates. In
Discovery
(2-4 years)
Preclinical
(3-4 years)
Phase 1& 2
(2 years)
Phase 3
(2-4 years)
Approval
and launch
Exploration
alliance:
experimentation of
new alternatives;
distant from launch;
low investment
Moderate-scale
exploitation
alliance: failure rate
high (80%),
investment
moderately high
($57 million at
Phase 1); moving
closer to launch
Large-scale
exploitation
alliance: failure
rate drops to 20% -
40 %, investment
very high ($418
million at Phase
3); much closer to
launch
Figure 1. Drug Discovery: Time Frame and Varying Investments and Risks
Source: Adapted from FDA (1999), and Chandy, Hopstaken, Narasimhan, and Prabhu (2006).
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the pharmaceutical industry, the NPD process is costly
and has a long time frame and a low success rate. Taking
a drug to market can involve a capitalized cost of over
$800 million (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski, 2003)
and take more than 13 years (Kellogg and Charnes,
2000). These features affect how investors interpret the
signals they receive from the entrepreneurial firms at dif-
ferent stages in the drug NPD process (Trope and Liber-
man, 2003).
To describe the different stages of the NPD process
for drugs, the prior literature has distinguished between
the exploration and exploitation phases (e.g., Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004). Co-development alliances formed at
the initial, exploration stage focus on upstream activities
in the value chain, such as basic research, drug discovery,
and development. Alliances formed at later stages focus
on exploitation, that is to say downstream activities,
including clinical trials, regulatory processes, and launch.
Within this second type of alliances, this study further
distinguishes between alliances focusing on moderate-
scale and large-scale downstream activities, where alli-
ances focusing on Phases 1 and 2 clinical trials are classi-
fied as “moderate-scale exploitation alliances” and those
focusing on Phase 3 clinical trials, approval, and launch
are termed “large-scale exploitation alliances” (Urbig,
B€urger, Patzelt, and Schweizer, 2013). This distinction is
important because of the significant differences between
these two types of exploitation in terms of the signaling
environment, in which clinical trials are expensive, risky,
and time-consuming (DiMasi et al., 2003; Urbig et al.,
2013). Overall, 58.6% of R&D expenditures for develop-
ing a new drug are spent on clinical trials, which may
last for an average of 6–7 years (PhRMA, 2010). Yet,
there is significant difference between moderate-scale
versus large-scale of clinical trials in terms of their differ-
ent scales and failure rates. Specifically, moderate-scale
clinical trials have a small to moderate number of
patients (i.e., often less than 100); average expenditure
on moderate-scale Phase 1 clinical trials is around $57
million. However, the figures can jump up to thousands
of patients in many different hospitals, and have been
said to rise to $418 million for late Phase 3 clinical trials
(Girotra et al., 2007). While the accumulated probability
of failure for preclinical and moderate-scale clinical
stages is around 80% (DiMasi et al., 2003; Moran, 2003),
for drugs that have entered the late Phase 3 clinical stage,
this figure comes down to just 20–40% (Himmelmann
and Schiereck, 2009; Kellogg and Charnes, 2000).
The question now is how do the above-summarized
features of the signaling environment impact the sig-
nals investors receive from entrepreneurial firms when
they form new co-development alliances?
Given the lengthy time frame of the NPD process for
drugs, the way in which investors’ interpretation of the
signals given depends on the drug development stage at
which an alliance is formed can be explained by con-
strual theory (Trope and Liberman, 2003). Construal
theory predicts that whether events or actions are
viewed in more abstract or more concrete terms depends
on how distant they are. To quote Trope and Liberman
(2003), “temporal distance changes people’s responses
to future events by changing the way people mentally
represent those events” (p. 403) and “distant future sit-
uations are construed on a higher level (i.e., using more
abstract and central features) than near future situations”
(Liberman and Trope, 1998, p. 5). Here, high-level con-
strual of actions, or how investors interpret events or
signals, includes the desirable outcomes, such as the end
value that would result from a new alliance. Low-level
construal of events or signals focuses on the feasibility
of the desired outcome, which refers to “the ease or dif-
ficulty of reaching the end state” (Trope and Liberman,
2003, p. 410). For example, for people looking for a job,
“desirability concerns the value of receiving a job offer,
whereas feasibility concerns the amount of time and
effort one has to invest to get the job offer” (Trope and
Liberman, 2003, p. 410). Construal theory thus suggests
that feasibility matters more for near-future judgments
and preferences, such that the “probability dimension
becomes more salient as time passes” (€Onc€uler, 2010, p.
113; Trope and Liberman, 2003). In near-future deci-
sions, people tend to underutilize high-level (desirabil-
ity) information, whereas in distant-future decisions
they tend to underutilize low-level (feasibility) informa-
tion (Trope and Liberman, 2003).
Thus, construal theory provides a number of
insights into drug discovery. When interpreting signals
of a firm pursuing an NPD alliance at a downstream
development stage, including moderate-scale and
large-scale exploitation alliances, investors are likely
to emphasize the firm’s ability to finalize the project
successfully and the feasibility of this happening.
Investors’ perception will change if such feasibility
changes. Hence, the large-scale exploitation stage con-
text is one in which feasibility is higher. In contrast,
when judging NPD alliances at the upstream develop-
ment stage of exploration, investors are less likely to
focus on the feasibility of NPD success because the
finalization of the development process and the prod-
uct’s market introduction are distant in time. Instead,
they will focus more on the desirability of NPD
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success, which concerns the value of a successful new
product launch. In fact, distant-future predictions may
be made with greater over-confidence than near-future
predictions (Trope and Liberman, 2003). This tendency
is captured by the behavior of future optimism, where
people tend to hold more positive expectancies for dis-
tant than near-future outcomes (Mitchell et al., 1997;
Trope and Liberman, 2003).
Figure 2 summarizes these arguments. The follow-
ing section elaborates on the relationships in Figure 2
by describing effects from the historical signals of
prior project suspensions and failures on value creation
and their respective contingent effects in different sig-
naling environments.
Hypotheses
Prior NPD Project Suspensions as Signals
As discussed above, a project may be suspended because
of timing issues and constraints affecting financial, techno-
logical, knowledge-related, and other resources. The sus-
pended project passes a screening gate; however, once the
resource and timing issues have been resolved, it can be
reactivated (Cooper, 2003; Cooper and Edgett, 2012;
Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1990). An NPD alliance is one
way to resolve these issues as alliance partners can provide
the knowledge, technologies, financing, and commerciali-
zation expertise needed to reactivate the suspended project
at the right time (Ahuja et al., 2008; Barney, 1991; Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004; Wernerfelt, 1984). Thus, project suspen-
sions may signal to outsiders that the focal firm has robust,
marketable ideas on which it cannot capitalize at the time
when the project is suspended.
In addition, during the creation of an alliance, the part-
ners tend to conduct a very careful assessment of the entre-
preneurial firm, evaluating its characteristics and the
signals of the likelihood of the alliance’s success. In tech-
nology- and science-intensive industries such as biotech-
nology, prior project suspensions may signal that the
firm’s NPD portfolio management involves a rigorous
decision-making process. In particular, the temporary
character of suspensions suggests that the management
has decided to give priority to other projects (Cooper and
Edgett, 2012), conveying to the partners and investors that
the firm does indeed have good, marketable ideas to offer,
and that it is competent in NPD management (Kester,
Hultink, and Griffin, 2014).
Finally, as discussed earlier, project suspensions are
not failures. For an entrepreneurial firm, entering into
an alliance may be interpreted by investors as a posi-
tive signal that alliances may bring the needed comple-
mentary resources for an idea to be made viable
(Brown, 1997) and reactivate suspended projects at the
right moment for the entrepreneurial firm.
In sum, prior project suspensions signal to investors
that the entrepreneurial firm has good ideas that may
be activated in a new co-development alliance, and
displays positive NPD management abilities. This will
lead to higher positive abnormal returns when entre-
preneurial firms with prior suspended projects
Internal signals:
1.Historical signals:
prior project suspensions and
failures; past performance
(control); technology quality
(control)
2. Scientific signal (control)
3. Market signal (control)
4. Locational signal (control)
External signals:
Alliance and partner:
exploration, moderate- and
large-scale exploitation
alliance, potential milestone,
partner reputation, partner
failures (controls)
Abnormal returns of
alliance announcement
Signaling environment: exploration and
moderate- and large- scale exploitation
across NPD stages
Other controls:
Focal firm: size, age, R&D scale,
financial slack, alliance experience
Figure 2. Conceptual Map
Note: Adapted from Connelly et al. (2011) and Rao et al. (2008).
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announce the formation of a new co-development alli-
ance. Formally:
H1: The prior NPD project suspensions of an
entrepreneurial firm have a positive effect on its
abnormal returns when it forms a new co-
development alliance.
Prior NPD Project Failures as Signals
The technology literature has suggested that firms’
technological trajectories are path-dependent (Dosi,
1982). Prior failures may signal declines in future
commercial capabilities by reducing desorptive capa-
bilities (Hu, McNamara, and McLoughlin, 2015) and a
weakening of future market-oriented innovations (Su
and McNamara, 2012). Consequently, the firm’s past
project failures may signal issues in current technology
portfolios that decrease attractiveness and increase
costs for prospective alliance partners, which in turn is
a negative signal to investors about the value a new
alliance formation may create.
Prior project failures may also raise doubts about an
entrepreneurial firm’s ability to learn from them (Shep-
herd and Cardon, 2009). Learning from failure is crit-
ically important to improve future performance, but it is
one of the most difficult tasks that an organization per-
forms (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), in particular
because of the negative impact of project failure on indi-
vidual learning behaviors and psychological well-being
(Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, Covin, and Kuratko, 2009).
Hence, an increasing number of prior project failures may
signal the firm’s difficulties in learning from failure and
an increased likelihood of making mistakes in the future.
Finally, prior project failures decrease the bargaining
power of the entrepreneurial firm vis-a-vis its alliance
partners. In a typical bargaining situation in alliances,
the more critical the resources and skills from the part-
ner’s perspective, the greater the firm’s bargaining
power (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). In high-technology
settings, large downstream firms seek NPD partnerships
with smaller upstream firms because the latter have
intangible resources and unique technological capabil-
ities in niche areas (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Stuart,
2000). However, if an entrepreneurial firm has a high
failure rate where NPD projects are concerned, its bar-
gaining power will decrease and may signal to investors
that the entrepreneurial firm’s alliance partner may be in
a better position to extract value from the new alliance
than the firm itself, implying a lower potential value cre-
ation by the firm and hence lower abnormal returns
when the formation of a new alliance is announced.
In sum, for an entrepreneurial firm, its prior NPD
failures signal technological, learning-related, and
bargaining-power issues for a new co-development alli-
ance, and these decrease its value-creation potential.
These arguments are consistent with prior research in
the area of finance which has evidenced negative abnor-
mal returns on clinical failure announcements by bio-
pharmaceutical firms (Girotra et al., 2007). There is also
evidence of a negative bias toward NPD failure
announcements with stock market declines in response
to them being many times greater than the positive
response to announcements of success in NPD (Sharma
and Lacey, 2004). Taking these arguments together, this
research predicts that:
H2: The prior NPD project failures of an entre-
preneurial firm have a negative effect on its
abnormal returns when it announces the formation
of a new co-development alliance.
Signaling Environment: The Contingent Effects of
Prior NPD Project Suspensions and Failures
H1 has predicted that higher levels of prior NPD pro-
ject suspensions on the part of an entrepreneurial firm
are positively associated with abnormal returns real-
ized when the firm announces the formation of a new
co-development alliance. In what follows, this research
discusses how the strength of this effect depends on
the changes in the signaling environment, that is to
say the different stages along the exploration–
exploitation continuum of the NPD process at which
alliances are formed.
According to construal theory (Trope and
Liberman, 2003), when judging NPD alliance in
upstream development stages of exploration, investors
are less likely to focus on the feasibility of NPD suc-
cess because the finalization of the development pro-
cess and the product’s market introduction are distant
in time. Instead, investors will focus on the desirability
of NPD success. As a result, they will have more opti-
mistic expectations of an alliance which is in the
exploration stage than an alliance in a later stage (cf.
Mitchell et al., 1997; Trope and Liberman, 2003). This
will make them view all signals sent by the entrepre-
neurial firms, such as signals of marketable ideas and
NPD management abilities inferred from prior project
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suspensions, in a more positive light. In this sense, the
positive signaling effect of prior NPD project suspen-
sions on abnormal returns when a new NPD alliance is
formed, as predicted in H1, may be stronger when the
alliance concerns NPD in the exploration stage than in
the exploitation stage.
Compared to exploration alliances, exploitation alli-
ances are less distant in time from the product launch.
Hence, for exploitation alliances, the feasibility aspect
of successful product launch becomes more prominent
than the desirability aspect (€Onc€uler, 2010). As dis-
cussed earlier, the feasibility of NPD success varies
significantly between moderate-scale and large-scale
exploitations, with a considerably higher failure rate of
just below 80% for moderate-scale exploitation
(DiMasi et al., 2003; Moran, 2003) compared to the
20–40% failure rate of large-scale exploitation
(Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Kellogg and
Charnes, 2000). As a result, investors’ value-creation
expectations will be comparatively low for moderate-
scale exploitation alliances because of the very high
failure rate at this stage, and improved for large-scale
exploitation alliances because the NPD success rate
improves significantly toward the end of the process.
This implies a significant shift in the signaling envi-
ronment between the moderate-scale and large-scale
exploitation stages of the NPD process, with investors
having increasingly positive expectations as the feasi-
bility of success (and their desire to focus on it)
increases. Hence, the positive signaling effect of prior
project suspensions on abnormal returns predicted in
H1 will be weaker for co-development alliances
engaged in moderate-scale exploitation than for those
undertaking large-scale exploitation. Whether there is
a significant difference between the signaling effects
of prior project suspensions in exploration alliances
(when investors focus on the desirability of success
and have optimistic expectations) versus large-scale
exploitation alliances (when investors focus on the
moderate probability of success at 60–80%) cannot be
determined on a theoretical level.
Combining the above arguments this research pre-
dicts that the signaling environment of exploration alli-
ances and large-scale exploitation alliances will be
more positive than that of moderate-scale exploitation
alliances. Formally:
H3: For an entrepreneurial firm, the positive effect
of its prior NPD project suspensions on abnormal
returns when a new co-development alliance is
formed is stronger for alliances of exploration and
large-scale exploitation than for alliances of
moderate-scale exploitation.
Let us now turn to the contingent signaling effect
of prior NPD project failures. H2 has predicted that
the prior NPD project failures of an entrepreneurial
firm are negatively associated with its abnormal
returns when new co-development alliances are
formed. Following the signaling and construal theories,
on the basis of which this research expects the signal-
ing environment to be less positive for moderate-scale
exploitation alliances than for exploration and large-
scale exploitation alliances, this research further
predicts that the negative effect of prior NPD project
failures is more pronounced in the case of the former
than the latter.
When evaluating an entrepreneurial firm with a
high level of prior NPD failures in the exploration
stage of a co-development alliance, investors tend to
be optimistic (as discussed earlier) and are therefore
likely to make insufficient efforts to garner information
about the firm’s NPD abilities and feasibility to suc-
cessfully complete the NPD process in the future. For
some, negative signals such as prior project failures
are deliberately ignored (€Onc€uler, 2010; Trope and
Liberman, 2003). As a result of this optimism, when
evaluating firms in exploration alliances, investors will
tend to focus on how they can recover from prior
NPD failures and on the desirability of possible NPD
success (Mitchell et al., 1997; Trope and Liberman,
2003). All these factors contribute to the weaker nega-
tive signaling effect of prior project failures for explo-
ration alliances in the upstream of NPD as compared
to exploitation alliances.
For exploitation alliances, as discussed earlier, the
feasibility of NPD success becomes more salient
(€Onc€uler, 2010), increasing from 20% for moderate-
scale exploitation alliances to 60–80% for large-scale
exploitation alliances (DiMasi et al., 2003;
Himmelmann and Schiereck, 2009; Kellogg and
Charnes, 2000; Moran, 2003). For large-scale exploita-
tion co-development in particular, the NPD process
outcomes become more predictable, with the prime
focus on exploitative searches for knowledge appropri-
ation, such as developing specific applications or mak-
ing minor improvements and alterations to current
products (Lee, 2011). This may lead to a weaker nega-
tive signaling effect on the part of prior NPD project
failures in large-scale exploitation alliances than in
moderate-scale exploitation alliances.
Therefore, this research predicts that:
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H4: The negative effect of an entrepreneurial
firm’s prior NPD project failures on abnormal
returns when new co-development alliances are
formed is stronger in the cases of alliances of
moderate-scale exploitation than alliances of
exploration and large-scale exploitation.
Methodology
Data, Sample, and Event Study
The empirical setting of this study is the biopharma-
ceutical industry. Data for this study was obtained from
industry-specific databases that monitor the alliance
and NPD project activities of biopharmaceutical firms,
namely Biocentury Archives, Biocentury Financial
Center, BioScan, and Pharmaprojects. Additional infor-
mation about alliances was obtained from the news
database Lexis-Nexis, while financial data was obtained
from GlobalVantage (accounting data on European
firms), Compustat (accounting data on U.S. firms), and
DataStream (stock prices and market indices).
The initial sample was the complete set of firms
active in the discovery and development of novel drug
compounds for human therapeutics between 1996 and
2003 that were listed on eight stock exchanges in the
United States and Europe. The choice of sample period
was dictated by data availability. The researchers were
interested in small and medium-sized entrepreneurial
firms and thus excluded all large biopharmaceutical
firms with a market capitalization above U.S. $3 bil-
lion in 2002. This filter reflects the unique distribution
of firms by capitalization in this industry (Rasmussen,
2010). Recent research has found that a small number
of large biopharmaceutical companies dominate the
industry. There are an estimated 3500 bio-
pharmaceutical firms globally, of which about 15% are
public companies. The vast majority of these firms are
small, with the majority of listed ones having a market
capitalization of less than $250 million (Rasmussen,
2010). Therefore, the filter of $3 billion has the
advantage of being able to capture all the small and
medium-sized entrepreneurial firms listed in the United
States and Europe, and at the same time to screen the
very large firms out of the sample (e.g., large biotech
firms such as Amgen were therefore excluded). The
resulting sample is a representative of all the small
and medium-sized entrepreneurial firms listed in the
United States and Europe.
In addition, the filter of $3 billion leads to a sample
comparable to a recent study on small firms by Yang
et al. (2014). More detailed comparison with this and
other studies is provided in Table 1. While the choice
of public companies required for the use of the event
study methodology provides methodological advan-
tages (Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha, 2010; Lee and
Chen, 2009; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009), the
authors acknowledge the limitations of the data, one of
which is that this research has no observations on pri-
vate firms. The simple comparison of key sample char-
acteristics of different studies provided in Table 1
shows that the average size and age of this study’s
sample firms is not unlike those used in other studies.
Some examples of the sample entrepreneurial firms
and their partners are provided in Table 2.
Table 1. A Comparison of the Sample with Those of Prior Studies
Name of the study Sample Firm size Firm age
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) 325 fully dedicated biotechnology firms that participated in 2226 R&D
alliances between 1973 and 1997, including public and private firms
161 9.6
De Carolis et al. (2009) 57 public biotechnology companies in the United States and Canada (1992–
2003)
798 13.06
Rao et al. (2008) All public biotechnology firms with 93 product introductions from 1982 to
2002 in the United States
550 15.39
Yang et al. (2014) All small biotechnology firms founded between 1984 and 1992 that generated
revenues lower than $100 million from 1984 to 2006 in the United States
191 12.03
Deeds and Hill (1996) All 132 firms engaged in biotechnology in the United States as of 1991 that
were developing in vivo therapeutics or diagnostics (including public and
private firms)
N/A 7.69
Our study sample 126 public firms listed on eight stock exchanges in the United States and
Europe between 1996 and 2003
210 10
Note: A simple analysis was conducted by comparing the key variables of this study’s sample with previous studies. Specifically, the size (measured
by number of employees) and age of firms were compared, since these are the only data available across different studies. Although the comparison
is rather indicative in nature, it shows that this study’s sample is similar in size and age to the samples included in the previous studies.
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The filter generated a sample of 126 entrepreneurial
firms, which made 2453 alliance announcements. The
research purpose was to understand the signaling
effects of new bi-party co-development alliances and
so this research eliminated any multi-party alliances
and follow-up agreements or contract extensions. Fol-
lowing good practice, all announcements confounded
with other value-relevant news in a window of 63
days around the focal announcement date were identi-
fied and eliminated (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).
Examples of confounding events included the
announcement of financial results, among others. This
reduced the number of firms to 104 and the number of
alliance announcements to 327. After accounting for
missing data, the final sample used for hypotheses test-
ing included 248 observations. Statistical analyses
were conducted to check if there was any issue with
the missing data. First, a t-test was used comparing the
mean of all the key variables between the missing and
nonmissing groups. The results were not significant.
Second, a logistic regression was used predicting miss-
ing data points (05 not missing, 15missing) from all
the key variables, and none of them were significant.
These results suggest that missing data is not an issue.
Dependent Variable
The event study method identifies abnormal movement
in a firm’s stock price (i.e., abnormal returns) on the
day the firm announces the formation of an alliance.
Abnormal returns are used as proxy for value creation
as a result of the new alliance and are therefore appro-
priate for testing the predicted signaling effects and
their contingencies. This research took the earliest alli-
ance announcement date reported in Biocentury
Archives, in Lexis-Nexis, or on the company’s website
and used abnormal returns noted on this day (provided
it was a trading day) as the dependent variable. Fol-
lowing Boyd et al. (2010), the market model of the
event study method was used to define the event of
interest as k and the event announcement day as t, and
the rate of return on the stock price of firm i on day t
was estimated according to the following formula:
Rit5ai1biRmt1eit; (1)
in which Rit represents the rate of return on the stock
price of firm i on day t; Rmt represents the correspond-
ing daily returns using the index of the local stock
market on day t, including the Nasdaq Composite
Index in the United States, the FTAllshare in the UK,
and, for European-listed firms the composite or best
available market index for that stock exchange; ai indi-
cates the intercept term; bi represents the systematic
risk of stock i; and eit stands for the residual of the
estimation.
Next, abnormal returns (ARit) for each firm were
estimated using the following equation:
eit5ARit5Rit2 ai1biRmtð Þ; (2)
from which the researchers obtained the ordinary least
squares parameter estimates by running regressions of
Rit on Rmt over a period of 250 days before the event
k (Boyd et al., 2010).
Thus, in generating the abnormal returns dependent
variable, this research employed the event study
method taking into account the multi-country setting
of this study (Park, 2004), eliminating observations
with confounding events (McWilliams and Siegel,
1997), and avoiding the use of a single expected-
returns model (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze,
1999). This methodology was adopted from the finance
literature and corporate governance studies
(McConnell and Nantell, 1985). It has been employed
extensively to study alliances (Gulati et al., 2009), and
in innovation and marketing research (Boyd et al.,
2010; Lee and Chen, 2009; Swaminathan and
Moorman, 2009).
Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and
T-statistics for abnormal returns on each of the trading
days from t525 to t5 5 (N5 248). Except for the
day 0, no other day’s abnormal returns differed from 0
significantly. The results indicate the accuracy of the
date of the first public announcement of alliance this
research identified. Thanks to this accuracy, gains
from alliance formation for the entrepreneurial firms
measured in this study are not only significant but also
Table 2. A Selection of Entrepreneurial Firms and
Their Partners in the Sample
Firm Partners Location of the firm
Acambis Plc Novartis United Kingdom
Arqule Inc Bayer United States
Genset SA Abbott Laboratories France
Karo Bio AB Abbott Laboratories Sweden
Oxford Glycosciences Merck United Kingdom
Phytopharm Plc Pfizer United Kingdom
Note: The table provides an illustration of the entrepreneurial firms
together with their partners. Additional data for all of the sample firms
indicates that the mean value of the total number of project failures dur-
ing the observation period for entrepreneurial firms is around 15, while
for the partner firms, this figure stands at 126.
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higher than some of the previous findings. Some of the
reasons for these higher returns include the focus on
smaller firms than many studies (Chang and Chen,
2002; Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 1998; Lee and Wyatt,
1990; Reuer and Koza, 2000) and the choice of R&D
intensive firms.
Independent Variables
Prior project suspensions. This variable is calcu-
lated as the accumulated number of all prior NPD pro-
ject suspensions on the part of the entrepreneurial firm
from 1990 until the day prior to the focal alliance
announcement (obtained from the Pharmaprojects
database). As an alternative, this variable was also
measured as the ratio of the total number of suspended
projects to the total number of all the drug develop-
ment initiatives in the focal firm in the period from
1990 to the year prior to the given event year. The
results are consistent.
Prior project failures. This variable is calculated as
the total number of a focal firm’s ceased drug develop-
ment initiatives from 1990 until the day prior to the
focal alliance announcement. This variable was also
measured as the ratio of the total number of ceased
drug development initiatives to the total number of all
the drug development initiatives in a focal firm in the
period from 1990 to the year prior to the given event
year (data from Pharmaprojects). The results are
consistent.
Exploration, moderate-scale, and large-scale
exploitation alliances dummy variables. The three
phases of the drug development process were captured
using dummy variables. Following previous research
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Urbig et al., 2013),
exploration alliances were defined as ones that focus
on upstream NPD activities (i.e., basic research, drug
discovery, and development), moderate-scale exploita-
tion alliances as ones that focus on moderate-scale
downstream NPD activities (Phase 1 and 2 clinical tri-
als), and large-scale exploitation alliances as those
focusing on large-scale downstream NPD activities
(including Phase 3 clinical trials, the regulatory pro-
cess, and marketing and sales; see Figure 1).
Control Variables
Following the conceptual framework (Figure 2), in
terms of internal signals, this research controlled for
two historical signals studied in prior literature: past
performance and technology quality. Scientific, market,
and locational signals were also included as control
variables. In terms of external signals, controls for
potential milestone, partner reputation, and partner
failures were included.
Past performance. A firm’s previous performance
may influence how investors evaluate the shareholder
value of its current event announcement (Robertson,
Eliashberg, and Rymon, 1995). In keeping with prior
literature (Lee and Chen, 2009), past performance was
measured using lagged Tobin’s q.
Technology quality. One important way for pharma-
ceutical firms to appraise the prospects of biotechnol-
ogy firms is by evaluating their patent portfolios
(Rothaermel, 2002). Prior literature used the number
of citations that a patent receives as a proxy for the
value of patents (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). This
research therefore used the natural logarithm of cumu-
lative patent citations to measure the quality of the
firm’s technology prior to the alliance announcement.
Scientific signal. This variable was measured as the
number of academics on the board of the entrepreneur-
ial firm (Rao et al., 2008). The data sources for this
were LexisNexis and SEC filings.
Market signal. This variable was measured as the
estimated market size of the therapeutic category and
signals the market potential of the drug which is the
subject of the new alliance. This data came from
Pharmaproject.
Locational signal. This is a dummy variable indi-
cating the geographical location of the firm. It is equal
Table 3. Abnormal Returns
Abnormal returns day Mean Std. dev. T-statistic
t 5 25 20.0019 0.052777 20.5688
t 5 24 20.00159 0.044607 20.5631
t 5 23 20.00156 0.052255 20.473
t 5 22 20.00176 0.052682 20.5284
t 5 21 20.00155 0.048377 20.5076
t 5 0 0.048913 0.117136 6.6024***
t 5 1 20.00096 0.059488 20.2558
t 5 2 20.0032 0.043371 21.1652
t 5 3 0.003779 0.044145 1.3534
t 5 4 20.00078 0.055028 20.223
t 5 5 20.0067 0.04853 22.1818
N5 248; ***p< 0.001.
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to 1 for a European firm and 0 for a U.S.-based firm.
This data came from company websites.
Own potential milestone. In co-development alli-
ances, one alliance partner may provide financial pay-
ments to another contingent on passing a given
development milestone. At the time of the formation
of the alliance, the financial value of these milestone
payments is often disclosed to the market. This amount
of money represents the total that would be paid if all
developmental milestones were met, however these are
stretching targets and few projects actually achieve all
milestones. These milestone payments are informative
for investors in that they demonstrate part of the value
that the partner sees in the project if it were fully suc-
cessful and the amount of funds that are available to
support the costs of NPD. This data came from Bio-
century Archives, Biocentury Financial Center, Bio-
Scan, and Pharmaprojects and is used in logged form
in the regression analysis.
Partner reputation. Following prior literature (Hitt,
Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Stuart,
2000), a partner dummy was included to model a part-
ner’s reputation and experiences in NPD. Specifically,
the partner dummy is equal to 1 if an alliance partner
was listed among the top 20 companies in the biophar-
maceutical industry in terms of the number of R&D
clinical trials originated and in-licensed by a firm in
the year of the focal alliance announcement; otherwise,
the variable equals 0. This variable was obtained from
Pharmaprojects and updated yearly.
Partner project failures. Partner firms’ failures
were measured as the ratio of the total number of
ceased drug development initiatives to the total num-
ber of all the drug development initiatives in a partner
firm in the period from 1990 to the year prior to the
given event year (data from Pharmaprojects). As an
alternative, this variable was also measured as a count
variable, and the results remained unchanged. Since a
partner with a larger number of NPD projects tends to
experience higher number of failures (other things
being equal), the count variable may control for the
partner’s R&D scale to some extent.
Besides controlling for signaling effects not focal to
this study, other factors that may have an impact on
abnormal returns and have been used in prior litera-
tures were also included. These are as follows.
Firm age. Number of calendar years after the estab-
lishment of the firm.
Firm size. Lagged employee count divided by
1000.
R&D scale. Lagged amount of R&D expenditure
divided by 1 million.
Financial slack. Equity-to-debt ratio, i.e., (total
assets2 total liabilities)/total liabilities, was used to
measure this variable. This ratio indicates a firm’s
unused borrowing capacity (Cheng and Kesner, 1997),
which captures the concept of unabsorbed slack. The
extant literature suggests that budgetary slack causes
the relaxation of controls, thereby allowing more
autonomy in project teams (Nohria and Gulati, 1996),
and possibly leading to better NPD outcomes (Bour-
geois, 1981).
Alliance experience. Prior literature has suggested
that alliance experience is an important determinant of
abnormal returns to strategic alliances in general
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Sampson, 2005). Alliance
experience was measured as a 1-year lagged and
logged count of all alliances the focal firm had prior to
the focal alliance, starting from 1990 or the year of
the firm’s establishment, whichever was later. Data
were obtained from company alliance portfolios listed
on an annual basis in BioScan and Pharmaprojects,
supplemented with alliances identified through Lexis–
Nexis.
Analysis
To test the hypotheses, all independent and control
variables were regressed on the abnormal returns using
White’s covariance matrix estimator to control for
potential heteroskedasticity, with an additional adjust-
ment for within-group dependence of observations in
the sample per firm (the “cluster” procedure; Stata-
Corp, 2007). This accounted for firm-specific effects.
All continuous independent variables were winsorized
at the 2.5% level and mean-centered. Winsorization
eliminates the potential effects of outliers by replacing
extreme values in each variable with the next respec-
tive value, counting inwards from the extremes (Ortiz-
Molina, 2006). Mean-centering prevents the occur-
rence of collinearity problems and facilitates the
interpretation of the estimation results where multipli-
cative terms are used (Aiken and West, 1991).
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A variance inflation factor (VIF) test found that the
average VIF value was 2.4 with all of the VIF values
well below the critical value of 10, indicating that col-
linearity is unlikely to be an issue in the models. To
avoid potential multicollinearity and following prior
research (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999), the interaction
effects were introduced in separate models. The full
model was also included.
Results
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics and correla-
tion matrices for the variables used in the study. From
Table 4, it is evident that there is considerable var-
iance in abnormal returns and focal independent varia-
bles in this study. Furthermore, the correlation
coefficient between prior project suspensions and pro-
ject failures (0.20) indicates consistency with the idea
that these can function as different signals.
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analy-
sis with robust errors. Models 0–5 reveal that control
variables produced mostly insignificant effects on
abnormal returns. This is similar to some prior
research that found no support for the effects of firm
size (Anand and Khanna, 2000) on abnormal returns
following alliance announcements. There are some
notable observations for the control variables. First,
the partner reputation dummy variable is always sig-
nificantly positive, suggesting that allying with top-20
companies in the biopharmaceutical industry increases
abnormal returns. This effect is not surprising, consid-
ering the insights from many prior alliance studies on
entrepreneurial firms (Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999).
Second, the signs of past performance are always posi-
tive, which is in line with the literature on path
dependence and the conceptualization of historical sig-
nals in this study. Third, the alliance experience vari-
able is always negative. This is consistent with the
patterns reflected in the findings of Gulati et al.
(2009), suggesting that general alliance experience
does not contribute positively to abnormal returns.
This result also alludes to the difficulty of learning
from alliance experience.
In Model 1, the main effect of prior project suspen-
sions was included. The result is positive and signifi-
cant (b5 0.023, p < 0.05). The result supports H1,
which predicted that prior suspended projects are posi-
tive signals about the entrepreneurial firm’s potential
to create value from a new alliance.
H2 predicted that prior project failures would have
a negative signaling effect on abnormal returns. In line
with this hypothesis, in Model 2, the prior project fail-
ures variable is significant and negative (b520.195,
p < 0.01). Models 3–5 render further support to the
hypothesis.
Models 3 and 4 introduce interaction effects to test
H3 and H4. Moderate-scale exploitation alliances are
always used as the reference group. Specifically, in
Model 3, the first interaction effects of interest were
entered: how the NPD stage at which the alliances are
formed (i.e., exploration and moderate and large-scale
exploitation) moderates the positive effect of sus-
pended projects. According to H3, the positive effect
of prior project suspensions on abnormal returns is
stronger for alliances of explorations and large-scale
exploitations than for alliances of moderate-scale
exploitations. The positive and significant result of the
interaction term between “prior project suspensions”
and “exploration alliance dummy” (b5 0.029, p <
0.01), and the positive but insignificant result of inter-
action term between “prior project suspensions” and
“large-scale exploitation alliance dummy” (b5 0.044,
p5 0.31) partially support this hypothesis. While the
positive sign with the large-scale exploitation alliance
is in line with the hypothesis, its insignificance is wor-
thy of further explanation. One possible reason for it
could be that investors pay less attention to the signal
from the prior project suspensions of the entrepreneur-
ial firm, but more attention to the failure signal from
the partner firms within a large-scale exploitation alli-
ance. In Model 5, the significant interaction term
between partner failures and a large-scale exploitation
alliance (b5 0.589, p< 0.05) indicates that this is a
possibility, suggesting a noteworthy effect from the
failure signal of partner firms when forming a large-
scale exploitation alliance.
Model 4 tested how the negative effect of prior fail-
ures is moderated by the NPD stage at which alliances
are formed. According to H4, this relationship is more
pronounced for moderate-scale exploitation alliances
than for exploration and large-scale exploitation alli-
ances. The positive sign of the interaction term
between “prior project failures” and “exploration alli-
ance dummy” from Model 4 (b5 0.253, p< 0.100)
and the insignificant results of interaction term
between “prior project failure” and “large-scale exploi-
tation alliance dummy” (b520.132, p5 0.574) par-
tially support this hypothesis. The negative sign of the
latter interaction term is intriguing. One possible
explanation could be discerned in the observations that
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prior failures are associated with rising operational
costs (Baum and Dahlin, 2007), which is a big concern
at the exploitation stage, where investments in large-
scale clinical trials are much higher than at moderate-
scale stages. The perceptions of such increased cost
might have led to a less favorable perception of the
“feasibility” of prior project failures, suggesting higher
investment to reach final launch. The other possible
explanation could come from the finance literature,
which has demonstrated a bias against failure in the
Table 5. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses of Abnormal Returns
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 VIF
Firm age 20.004 20.005 20.003 20.003 20.002 20.001 2.66
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm size 20.200 20.136 0.047 0.081 0.122 0.147 4.36
(0.136) (0.121) (0.128) (0.129) (0.152) (0.123)
R & D scale 20.004 20.005 20.010 20.012 0.000 20.002 2.67
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.011)
Financial slack 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 2.45
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012)
Alliance experience 20.006 20.013 20.022 20.023 20.025 20.022 2.35
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Potential milestone 20.002 0.000 20.001 20.002 20.001 20.002 1.67
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Exploration alliance dummy 20.015 20.016 20.023 20.025 20.029 20.033 1.77
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Large-scale exploitation dummy 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.024 0.005 0.032 2.10
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.035) (0.026) (0.027)
Partner reputation 0.110** 0.111** 0.109** 0.101** 0.104*** 0.096*** 1.67
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.026) (0.025)
Partner failure 0.058 0.075 0.115 0.108 0.109 0.024 2.69
(0.061) (0.063) (0.070) (0.073) (0.079) (0.103)
Scientific signal 0.000 0.003 20.004 20.007 20.006 20.012 1.95
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Market signal 0.005 0.008 0.002 20.004 20.005 20.018 1.47
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Location signal 0.007 20.003 0.013 0.011 0.025 0.031 2.11
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
Historical signal: past performance 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006 1.66
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Historical signal: technology quality 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.004 20.001 20.005 4.16
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Prior project suspensions 0.023* 0.025* 0.007 0.027* 0.005 3.41
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Prior project failures 20.195** 20.209** 20.307* 20.350** 2.59
(0.068) (0.070) (0.113) (0.110)
Prior project suspensions 3 Exploration alliance dummy 0.029** 0.032 2.70
(0.010) (0.017)
Prior project suspensions 3 Large-scale exploitation alliance dummy 0.044 0.046 1.55
(0.043) (0.032)
Prior project failures 3 Exploration alliance dummy 0.253 0.289 2.59
(0.150) (0.146)
Prior project failures 3 Large-scale exploitation alliance dummy 20.132 20.128 1.52
(0.207) (0.196)
Partner failures 3 Exploration alliance dummy 0.029 2.28
(0.149)
Partner failures 3 Large-scale exploitation alliance dummy 0.589* 1.67
(0.235)
Constant 0.016 20.018 0.009 0.053 0.044 0.146
(0.066) (0.064) (0.077) (0.084) (0.077) (0.098)
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.51
Note: N5 248. The estimated coefficients and the robust standard errors (in parentheses below the estimates) have been adjusted for clustering by
company. In Model 3–5 where the interaction effects are included, a moderate-scale exploitation alliance dummy is used as the reference group. Sig-
nificance levels are two-tailed.
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
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financial markets. At the large-scale exploitation stage,
investors can be very sensitive to past failures and
may therefore react negatively.
Model 5 is the full model. The results are consistent
with the major findings of the partial Models 1–4, and
support the hypotheses.
Robustness Checks and Additional
Analyses
To test the robustness of the results, a number of addi-
tional analyses were performed to address the follow-
ing questions.
How Do Prior Project Suspensions and Failures
Influence Actual Successful NPD Launches?
The analyses show that prior project suspensions
increase the value-creation potential of new co-
development alliances, while prior failures decrease it.
However, it is not clear how prior suspensions and
failures affect actual product development rather than
the instant effect of the stock market response. The
answers to such questions could generate new insights.
Therefore, two additional analyses were conducted as
follows. First was a regression model using successful
product launches as the dependent variable, and one-
year lagged prior project suspensions and prior project
failures as independent variables, together with the
other control variables included in the models in Table 5.
The results in Table 6 suggest that prior project sus-
pensions have a significantly positive effect on actual
product launches, while prior project failures have a
negative one. Next, a logistic model with prior project
suspensions and failures was used to predict success
in product launches. Again the results (not shown
here to save space) confirm that prior project suspen-
sions can effectively predict successful product
launch.
How Are the Empirical Measures of Suspensions
and Failures Consistent with the
Conceptualization?
The two variables of project suspensions and project
failures are conceptually distinct. For example, project
suspensions should be temporary in nature, and long-
term suspensions could be seen as failures. Empiri-
cally, it is necessary to know more about the differen-
ces between the failure and suspension measures in the
context of NPD in the biopharmaceutical industry. To
address these issues, further analyses were conducted.
This study used data on project suspensions and
failures from the Pharmaprojects database. Pharma-
projects scans relevant publications and contacts com-
panies directly to keep track of the drug development
activity in the industry. According to its manual, pro-
ject suspension is defined as project “development sus-
pended with the possibility of restarting,” while
project failure is defined as “development terminated.”
In addition to the two types of status of NPD projects,
Pharmaprojects also records a third type, namely “no
development reported,” meaning “no evidence of con-
tinuing development reported.” A product profile is
Table 6. The Effect of Prior Project Suspensions and
Failures on Actual Projects that Were Ultimately
Successful NPD Launches
Variables
Firm age 0.00
(0.01)
Past performance 0.01
(0.01)
Financial slack 0.01
(0.00)
Firm size 2.51***
(0.60)
Alliance experience 20.10
(0.06)
R & D scale 0.00
(0.00)
Technology quality 0.10*
(0.05)
Location dummy 1.49***
(0.36)
Partner reputation 0.06
(0.11)
Partner failure 0.26
(0.35)
Lagged suspended projects 0.12*
(0.06)
Lagged failed projects 20.04
(0.02)
Constant 20.18
(0.24)
Note: Dependent variable5Ln (number of successful product
launches); N5 54, adjusted R25 0.81. The positive and significant sign
of firm size suggests that larger firms achieve more successful launches.
This is also true for technology quality and location dummy for firms
based in Europe, and for project suspensions. Prior failed projects are
negatively linked to successful launches. The results remain robust after
controlling for year fixed effect and firm fixed effects.
As robustness checks, a Poisson regression was run using the number
of successful product launches (a count variable) as the dependent vari-
able, with other independent variables included above. The results
remain largely unchanged. Bootstrapping regressions were run, and the
substantive results remain largely unchanged.
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
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designated as “no development reported” when no new
information or evidence of continuing development
has been found for a period of around 12–18 months.
This label remains until active development resumes
or the company confirms that the drug has been dis-
continued or terminated.
By this definition, no project can be designated in
the database as “suspended” longer than 12–18
months. If a suspension lasts for over 18 months, it
will be labeled as “no development reported,” and in
this case the length of suspensions should be smaller
than or at most equal to the “no development
reported” period. Thus, project suspensions in the data
are temporary in nature. As illustrated in Figure 3, a
distinctive pattern emerges for the time period of the
three types of project status: namely suspensions, fail-
ures and no development reported.
The number of months from start to final termina-
tion of a failed project is considerably larger than the
maximum number of months for which a project can
retain the status of “no development reported.” Since
the duration of a project suspension is smaller than or
at the most equal to the maximum number of months
for which a project can be labeled as “no development
reported,” from the comparison in Figure 3, one can
conclude that the duration of project suspensions is
much shorter than the life span of a failed project.
In addition, a failure may be dressed up as a sus-
pension when firms with higher failure rates intention-
ally send false signals (Johnstone and Grafen, 1993). It
is also necessary to have a better understanding of the
degree to which there is an overlap between suspen-
sions and failures. To probe this possibility, the
researchers conducted a logistic regression, using pro-
ject failure rates (i.e., the ratio of the total number of
ceased drug development initiatives to the total num-
ber of all the drug development initiatives) in a focal
firm to predict the likelihood of project suspensions
while controlling for the other control variables included
in Table 5. The results indicate that project failure rates
do not predict project suspensions, suggesting that firms
with higher failure rates would not be more likely to
intentionally report failures as suspensions.
Beyond the analyses addressing the above questions,
a number of other analyses were conducted. First was a
test for potential selection bias, because entrepreneurial
firms’ valuations may be affected by unobserved factors
that also influence entrepreneurial firms’ intentions to
form alliances, causing an endogeneity problem. There-
fore a conventional Heckman two-stage approach was
performed. In the first stage the tendency of forming
alliances with partner firms was regressed on firm size,
age, past performance, R&D expenditure, and failure
rate. It was assumed that entrepreneurial firms with a
higher failure rate and fewer resources were under
greater pressure to form alliances with large firms to
access external resources (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1996). The test suggested that selection was not an issue
for this study’s sample.
Second, previous research suggests that organiza-
tions require a certain amount of experiences of failure
before they can extract and effectively apply knowl-
edge from others’ failures. Those with relatively little
direct failure experience may misapply knowledge
from their own successes and others’ failures. There-
fore the potential nonlinear relationship of the interac-
tion effects was tested in an effort to identify the ideal
failure rate (Barczak, 2014). These models suffered
from potential multicolinearity (VIF >10) as a result
of the simultaneous inclusion of the higher-order varia-
bles as both main effects and interaction effects. Such
potential multicollinearity may produce misleading
results since it artificially inflates the p-values of the
individual effects (Greene, 2002). Further tests of the
potential nonlinear relationship of project suspensions
led to similar issues.
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Figure 3. A Comparison of the Time during which Projects
Are Designated as Failed Projects, Projects with No Devel-
opment Reported, and Suspended Projects
Note: As indicated by the dots in the figure, the number of
months from the start to the final termination of a failed
project is significantly larger than the number of months in
which a project can keep its status as “no development
reported” (as indicated by the region in the shaded box).
Since the duration of project suspensions is less than or at
the most equal to the maximum number of months for
which a project can be labeled as “no development
reported,” their duration falls within the shaded box (i.e.,
between 0 and 18 months).
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Third was a check for any potential effects associ-
ated with the timing of alliance announcements over
the industry life cycle. During the sample period,
1996–2003, the biopharmaceutical industry gained sig-
nificantly in commercial and technological maturity.
To account for this potential bias, calendar year dum-
mies were included in each of the models. The sub-
stantive results remained unchanged.
Fourth, alternative alliance dummies were used as
the reference group in the interaction terms, the main
results remained unchanged.
Finally, a finer-grained categorization of the signal-
ing environment capturing every stage of the NPD
process was considered. However, there were missing
data for some of the stages, which decreased the sam-
ple size, while these analyses required five additional
variables as main effects, and 5 3 25 10 interaction
effects. The results were consistent with the current
analysis, but the models lacked degrees of freedom
and hence are not reported here.
Discussion
Main Results
In many industries, including the pharmaceutical (Evans
and Varaiya, 2003), telecommunications (Buganza, Del-
l’Era, and Verganti, 2009), software (Ethiraj, Kale,
Krishnan, and Singh, 2009), and electronics ones (Ter-
wiesch, Loch, and Niederkofler, 1998), entrepreneurial
firms often enter into co-development alliances in pur-
suit of commercial innovations with large firms and
other organizations. In these industries, failures and set-
backs are an integral aspect of the NPD process. This
article focused on the pharmaceutical industry, in which
only 1 out of 5000 drug candidates reaches market
launch (Evans and Varaiya, 2003) and only 20% of
drugs that make it to the market generate a financial
return in excess of their cost of capital (Vernon, Golec,
and DiMasi, 2010). Hence, research into the impact of
prior project failures on the performance of subsequent
NPD endeavors and how to improve this performance is
critically important. Thus far, there has been limited
research in this area. This is because failures are generally
hidden both internally and from external parties as compa-
nies and individuals do not wish to admit them publicly
nor take responsibility for them (Montoya-Weiss and Cal-
antone, 1994; Smith-Doerr, Manev, and Rizova, 2004).
Managers therefore speak asymmetrically about successes
and failures. Only recently have scholars started to inves-
tigate how NPD failures affect firm performance and why
some firms are affected by them differently than others
(De Carolis et al., 2009; Girotra et al., 2007; Sarkar and
De Jong, 2006; Urbig et al., 2013). This line of research,
however, does not say much about project suspensions,
either theoretically or empirically (Cooper and Edgett,
2012).
In regulated NPD environments where regulators
proactively test the efficacy of an innovation and halt
the development of innovations that are dangerous,
both NPD project suspensions and failures can be
observed. As argued in this article, project suspensions
and failures are both indicative of a firm’s inability to
carry out a project to successful completion, but sus-
pensions are distinct from failures in that, unlike failed
projects, suspended ones (a) pass screening criteria
and offer good investment potential and (b) can be
reactivated once critical resource and timing issues
have been resolved, for example when an alliance
partner brings in the required expertise and financing.
Past innovation research has provided mixed findings
regarding the relationship between project suspensions
and failures and value creation. It has been argued that
project suspensions in NPD may cause delays to the
market, yet suspensions may also improve new product
quality and the chances of success later on (McNally
et al., 2011). Similarly, project failure may both
improve and impede value creation. On the positive
side, experience of failure has been shown to aid in
organizational transformation (McNamara and Baden-
Fuller, 1999), improve a firm’s adaptability to environ-
mental changes, and develop organizational reliability
(Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2008). Failure experience
may also improve the outcomes of subsequent explora-
tory R&D (Su and McNamara, 2012). However, prior
failures are associated with rising operational costs
(Baum and Dahlin, 2007) and are viewed negatively by
peers (Edmondson, 2011). Therefore, more research
into failure in innovation is needed (Barczak, 2014), in
particular to understand its main and contingent effects
on subsequent value creation.
To address this need, this article used signaling
theory to delineate the positive effects of prior sus-
pended projects and the negative effects of prior pro-
ject failures on value creation by new co-development
alliances. The findings provide new insights into the
value of abandoned or shelved ideas and projects by
shifting the focus away from temporal structuring
mechanisms internal to a firm (Garud, Gehman, and
Kumaraswamy, 2011; Lokshin et al., 2011; Orlikowski
and Yates, 2002) and onto external mechanisms such
as co-development alliances. The positive effect of
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project suspensions suggests that these may provide an
opportunity for NPD teams to reflect on, articulate,
and codify lessons learned from project experiences,
and hence to improve future NPD project management
(Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams, and Warnecke, 2014)
and portfolio management; the latter has been rated as
the weakest area of NPD (Cooper and Kleinschmidt,
1995; Kester et al., 2014).
In this study, the researchers further considered the
contingent effect of suspended projects and failures by
differentiating between alliances formed at different
stages of the NPD process, namely exploration,
moderate-scale exploitation, and large-scale exploitation.
A particularly interesting finding is the contingent effect
whereby exploration stages of the drug development pro-
cess provide a positive context that enhances the positive
impact of prior project suspensions and limits the nega-
tive impact of prior project failures on the value which
investors attach to new co-development alliances. In
contrast, moderate-scale exploitation stages of the drug
development process provide a negative context. This
has important implications for both theory and practice.
Theoretical Implications
Regarding theory, the findings demonstrate the effect of
the signaling context on developing new drugs and prod-
ucts more broadly (Connelly et al., 2011; Lester et al.,
2006) and suggest that signaling effects are contingent
not only on how far a product is in its development pro-
cess but also on an individual’s (in this case, an invest-
or’s) perceptions. This adds to the prior co-development
literature, which has considered alliances that combine
complementary resources as a value-creation mechanism
without taking the contingencies of the NPD process into
account (Alvarez and Barney, 2001; Gulati et al., 2009;
Yang et al., 2014). The insights deriving from construal
theory indicate that the perceived value of prior and cur-
rent projects—suspended, failed, and new co-
development alliances—depends on the time (and psy-
chological) distance from expected outcomes, such as
new product launch. The further away a project is in time,
the more individuals focus on the desirability of outcomes
rather than their actual probability, and the more optimis-
tic they become in their evaluations of these projects
(Trope and Liberman, 2003). This creates a distorting
effect, whereby exploration projects are viewed more pos-
itively than moderate-scale exploitation projects, even
though considering the actual odds of success the opposite
should be expected. Hence, future research may consider
cognitive and psychological factors when analyzing the
meaning and impact of signals (cf. Ozcan and Overby,
2008), but also when studying suboptimal NPD decisions
that may hinder learning and decrease performance.
Managerial Implications
Considering the high failure rate in NPD and the
lack of prior research on the different setbacks which
may occur, the results of this study offer managerial
insights for NPD management practice, in particular
for managers of high-technology firms. This study’s
results will help them to better anticipate and under-
stand the financial consequences of prior NPD pro-
ject suspensions and failures. By understanding the
differential impacts of suspensions and failures, man-
agers can better analyze and assess past setbacks and
failures and raise awareness about companies’ sus-
pension and failure profiles in accordance with set-
back types, and how value can best be generated in
alliances. The findings on the positive influence of
prior NPD project suspensions may suggest that pro-
actively managing the tasks of portfolio manage-
ment, including de-prioritizing existing projects
while allocating and re-allocating resources to active
projects (Cooper et al., 1998, 2001; Griffin, 1997),
can send out positive signals to investors that the
firm has good potential resources and a sound man-
agement ability to create better value in NPD alli-
ances. The findings from this research therefore help
to shed light on the effective mechanisms for tolerat-
ing setbacks, and creating or preserving value in
innovation (Barczak, 2014).
Furthermore, the results suggest that exploration alli-
ances add more to the positive value created by suspen-
sions (or do more to counter the damage caused by
failures) than moderate-scale exploitation alliances. In
light of this particular finding, managers should be
aware that signaling suspensions and failures to investors
can influence their expectations and consequently impact
shareholder value in the case of NPD alliance announce-
ment. In particular, exploratory alliances seem to be an
attractive stage at which to create or preserve value. Fur-
thermore, the high failure rate in NPD suggests the need
for firms to develop a culture that tolerates a process of
developing innovations without certainty of outcomes,
patience in the face of mounting losses, and willingness
to accept failure (Tellis, 2012). For those firms planning
to build a culture of tolerance toward failure, entering
co-development alliances may be more desirable at
exploratory stages than later on.
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In fact, exploration alliances can be conduits for organ-
izational learning and co-creation of knowledge by part-
ners where each party attempts to identify, transfer, and
absorb part or all of the counterpart’s valuable knowledge
assets (Lubatkin, Florin, and Lane, 2001). Clarity about
these effects can help managers to create and manage col-
laborations by addressing the conditions under which
firms can create and preserve value in alliances (Fang,
Lee, and Yang, 2015; Gulati et al., 2009; Merchant and
Schendel, 2000). Importantly, of course, managers must
also consider whether such signaling measures that pre-
serve firm value in the short run can lead to success in the
long run. In particular, they need to be aware of the poten-
tial psychological and cognitive factors that may lead to
NPD screening and investment decisions that are more
optimistic than rational, as such effects may apply equally
to both investors and decision makers. It would be interest-
ing for future research to investigate such effects.
Limitations and Future Research
Like all studies, the present one has limitations that in
turn provide opportunities for future research. First, this
article examined different types of setback from the per-
spective of the NPD process. Other types of setback and
the impact of the heterogeneity of failure experience
should be looked at in future studies (Haunschild and
Sullivan, 2002). For example, future research could look
into the types of NPD failure in incremental innovations
and radical innovations. In addition, research might look
at other types of failure during NPD, such as process
failure (Shepherd et al., 2009) and strategic failure (Lant
and Montgomery, 1987).
Second, this study focused only on biopharmaceutical
companies, and thus on a single high-technology indus-
try. While this sampling technique rules out methodo-
logical threats such as potential confounding effects
(Zheng, Liu, and George, 2010), it raises the question of
generalizability to a larger population. Caution must be
exercised when transferring findings from a single indus-
try to others, for example to an industry with shorter
NPD cycles. It is hoped that future research will test
whether this study’s findings are robust in settings other
than the biopharmaceutical industry.
Third, due to data limitations, this research could not
find out what the ideal failure rate may be for the firms.
Detailed data on project suspensions and failures at each
and every stage of NPD may be helpful in this regard.
Fourth, the event study method used in this study has its
limitations, such as the inability to include private firms.
Finally, this study provides only a snapshot of
investors’ reactions to how alliance events are affected
by project suspensions and failures of firms; a long-
term view may provide additional valuable insights
(Sood and Tellis, 2009).
References
Ahuja, G., C. M. Lampert, and V. Tandon. 2008. Moving beyond
Schumpeter: Management research on the determinants of technolog-
ical innovation. The Academy of Management Annals 2 (1): 1–98.
Aiken, L. S., and S. G. West. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and
interpreting interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Akdeniz, M. B., R. J. Calantone, and C. M. Voorhees. 2014. Signaling
quality: An examination of the effects of marketing-and nonmarket-
ing-controlled signals on perceptions of automotive brand quality.
Journal of Product Innovation Management 31 (4): 728–43.
Aldrich, H. E., and C. M. Fiol. 1994. Fools rush in? The institutional context
of industry creation. Academy of Management Review 19 (4): 645–70.
Alvarez, S. A., and J. B. Barney. 2001. How entrepreneurial firms can
benefit from alliances with large partners. Academy of Management
Executive 15 (1): 139–48.
Anand, B. N., and T. Khanna. 2000. Do firms learn to create value?
The case of alliances. Strategic Management Journal 21: 295–317.
Barczak, G. 2014. From the editor: JPIM research priorities. Journal of
Product Innovation Management 31 (4): 640–41.
Barczak, G., A. Griffin, and K. B. Kahn. 2009. Perspective: Trends and driv-
ers of success in NPD practices: Results of the 2003 PDMA best prac-
tices study. Journal of Product Innovation Management 26 (1): 3–23.
Barney, J. B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.
Journal of Management 17 (1): 99–120.
Baron, R. A. 2000. Psychological perspectives on entrepreneurship:
Cognitive and social factors in an entrepreneur’s success. Current
Directions in Psychological Science 9 (1): 15–18.
Baum, J. A. C., and J. K. B. Dahlin. 2007. Aspiration performance and
railroads’ patterns of learning from train wrecks and crashes. Orga-
nization Science 18 (3): 368–85.
Baum, J. A. C., and B. S. Silverman. 2004. Picking winners or building
them? Alliance, intellectual, and human capital as selection criteria
in venture financing and performance of biotechnology startups.
Journal of Business Venturing 19 (3): 411–36.
Blau, G. E., J. F. Pekny, V. A. Varma, and P. R. Bunch. 2004. Managing a
portfolio of interdependent new product candidates in the pharmaceutical
industry. Journal of Product Innovation Management 21 (4): 227–45.
Bourgeois, L. J. 1981. On the measurement of organizational slack.
Academy of Management Review 6 (1): 29–39.
Boyd, D. E., R. K. Chandy, and M. Cunha Jr. 2010. When do chief
marketing officers affect firm value? A customer power explanation.
Journal of Marketing Research 47 (6): 1162–76.
Brown, J. S. 1997. Changing the game of corporate research: Learning
to thrive in the fog of reality. In Technological innovation: Over-
sights and foresights, ed. R. Garud, P. R. Nayyar, and Z. Shapira,
95–110. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, S. L., and K. M. Eisenhardt. 1995. Product development: Past
research, present findings, and future directions. Academy of Man-
agement Review 20 (2): 343–78.
Buganza, T., C. Dell’Era, and R. Verganti. 2009. Exploring the relation-
ships between product development and environmental turbulence:
The case of mobile TLC services. Journal of Product Innovation
Management 26 (3): 308–21.
22 J PROD INNOV MANAG
2016;00(00):00–00
Y. HU ET AL.
Busenitz, L. W., J. O. Fiet, and D. D. Moesel. 2005. Signaling in venture capi-
talist–new venture team funding decisions: Does it indicate long-term
venture outcomes? Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 29 (1): 1–12.
Carmeli, A., and J. Schaubroeck. 2008. Organizational crisis prepared-
ness: The importance of learning from failure. Long Range Plan-
ning 41 (2): 177–96.
Certo, S. T., C. M. Daily, and D. R. Dalton. 2001. Signaling firm value
through board structure: An investigation of initial public offerings.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 26 (2): 33–50.
Chandy, R., B. Hopstaken, O. Narasimhan, and J. Prabhu. 2006. From
invention to innovation: Conversion ability in product development.
Journal of Marketing Research 43 (3): 494–508.
Chang, S.-C., and S.-S. Chen. 2002. The wealth effect of domestic joint
ventures: Evidence from Taiwan. Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting 29 (1/2): 201–22.
Chatterjee, S., M. H. Lubatkin, and W. S. Schulze. 1999. Toward a stra-
tegic theory of risk premium: Moving beyond CAPM. Academy of
Management Review 24 (3): 556–567.
Chen, M. J., and D. C. Hambrick. 1995. Speed, stealth, and selective
attack: How small firms differ from large firms in competitive
behavior. Academy of Management Journal 38 (2): 453–82.
Cheng, J. L. C., and I. F. Kesner. 1997. Organizational slack and
response to environmental shifts: The impact of resource allocation
patterns. Journal of Management 23 (1): 1–18.
Cohen, B. D., and T. J. Dean. 2005. Information asymmetry and inves-
tor valuation of IPOs: Top management team legitimacy as a capital
market signal. Strategic Management Journal 26 (7): 683–90.
Cohen, W. M., and D. A. Levinthal. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new
perspective on learning and innovation. Administrative Science
Quarterly 35 (1): 128–52.
Connelly, B. L., S. T. Certo, R. D. Ireland, and C. R. Reutzel. 2011.
Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management
37 (1): 39–67.
Cooper, R. G. 1990. Stage-gate systems: A new tool for managing new
products. Business Horizons 33 (3): 44–54.
Cooper, L. P. 2003. A research agenda to reduce risk in new product
development through knowledge management: A practitioner per-
spective. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management 20
(1–2): 117–40.
Cooper, R. G. 2008. Perspective: The Stage GateVR idea to launch pro-
cess—Update, what’s new, and NexGen systems. Journal of Prod-
uct Innovation Management 25 (3): 213–32.
Cooper, R. G., and S. J. Edgett. 2012. Best practices in the idea-to-
launch process and its governance. Research-Technology Manage-
ment 55 (2): 43–54.
Cooper, R. G., S. J. Edgett, and E. J. Kleinshmidt. 1998. Portfolio man-
agement for new products. New York: Perseus Books.
Cooper, R. G., S. J. Edgett, and E. J. Kleinschmidt. 1999. New product
portfolio management: Practices and performance. Journal of Prod-
uct Innovation Management 16 (4): 333–51.
Cooper, R. G., S. J. Edgett, and E. J. Kleinschmidt. 2002. Optimizing
the stage-gate process: What best-ractice companies do. Research-
Technology Management 45 (5): 21–27.
Cooper, R. G., and E. J. Kleinschmidt. 1990. New product success fac-
tors: A comparison of “kills” versus successes and failures. R&D
Management 20 (1): 47–63.
Das, S., and P. K. Sen, and S. Sengupta. 1998. Impact of strategic alliances
on firm valuation. Academy of Management Journal 41 (1): 27–41.
De Carolis, D. M., Y. Yang, D. L. Deeds, and E. Nelling. 2009. Weath-
ering the storm: The benefit of resources to high-technology ven-
tures navigating adverse events. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal
3 (2): 147–60.
Deeds, D. L., and C. W. Hill. 1996. Strategic alliances and the rate of
new product development: An empirical study of entrepreneurial
biotechnology firms. Journal of Business Venturing 11 (1): 41–55.
DiMasi, J. A., R. W. Hansen, and H. G. Grabowski. 2003. The price of
innovation: New estimates of drug development costs. Journal of
Health Economics 22 (2): 151–85.
Dosi, G. 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories:
A suggested interpretation of the determination and directions of
technical change. Research Policy 11 (2): 147–62.
Dosi, G. 1988. Sources, procedures, and microeconomic effects of inno-
vation. Journal of Economic Literature 26(3): 1120–71.
Edmondson, A. 2011. Strategies for learning from failure. Harvard
Business Review 89 (4): 48–55.
Eisenhardt, K. M., and C. B. Schoonhoven. 1996. Resource-based view
of strategic alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entre-
preneurial firms. Organization Science 7 (2): 136–50.
Emden, Z., R. J. Calantone, and C. Droge. 2006. Collaborating for new prod-
uct development: Selecting the partner with maximum potential to create
value. Journal of Product Innovation Management 23 (4): 330–41.
Ethiraj, S. K., P. Kale, M. S. Krishnan, and J. V. Singh. 2009. Where do
capabilities come from and how do they matter? A study in the soft-
ware services industry. Strategic Management Journal 26 (1): 25–45.
Evans, A. G., and N. P. Varaiya. 2003. Assessment of a biotech market
opportunity. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 28 (1): 87–105.
Fang, E. 2008. Customer participation and the trade-off between new
product innovativeness and speed to market. Journal of Marketing
72 (July): 90–104.
Fang, E., J. Lee, and Z. Yang. 2015. The timing of codevelopment alli-
ances in new product development processes: Returns for upstream
and downstream partners. Journal of Marketing 79 (1): 64–82.
FDA. 1999. From test tube to patient: Improving health through human
drugs. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Fleming, L., and O. Sorenson, 2001. Technology as a complex adaptive
system: Evidence from patent data. Research Policy 30 (7): 1019–39.
Garud, R., J. Gehman, and A. Kumaraswamy. 2011. Complexity
arrangements for sustained innovation: Lessons from 3M corpora-
tion. Organization Studies 32 (6): 737–67.
Garud, R., P. Tuertscher, and A. H. Van de Ven. 2013. Perspectives on inno-
vation processes. The Academy of Management Annals 7 (1): 775–819.
George, G., S. A. Zahra, and D. R. Wood, Jr. 2002. The effects of busi-
ness–university alliances on innovative output and financial per-
formance: A study of publicly traded biotechnology companies.
Journal of Business Venturing 17 (6): 577–609.
Girotra, K., C. Terwiesch, and K. T. Ulrich. 2007. Valuing R&D proj-
ects in a portfolio: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry.
Management Science 53 (9): 1452–66.
Grant, R. M., and C. Baden-Fuller. 2004. A knowledge accessing theory
of strategic alliances. Journal of Management Studies 41 (1): 61–84.
Greene, W. H. 2002. Econometric analysis (5th ed.). Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Griffin, A. 1997. PDMA research on new product development prac-
tices: Updating trends and benchmarking best practices. Journal of
Product Innovation Management 14 (6): 429–58.
Gulati, R., and M. C. Higgins. 2003. Which ties matter when? The con-
tingent effects of interorganizational partnerships on IPO success.
Strategic Management Journal 24 (2): 127–44.
Gulati, R., D. Lavie, and H. Singh. 2009. The nature of partnering expe-
rience and the gains from alliances. Strategic Management Journal
30 (11): 1213–33
Gulati, R., and L. O. Wang. 2003. Size of the pie and share of the pie:
Implications of structural embeddedness for value creation and
PROJECT SUSPENSIONS AND FAILURES IN NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT J PROD INNOV MANAG
2016;00(00):00–00
23
value appropriation in joint ventures. Research in the Sociology of
Organizations 20: 209–42.
Haunschild, P. R., and B. N. Sullivan. 2002. Learning from complexity:
Effects of prior accidents and incidents on airlines’ learning. Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly 47 (4): 609–43.
Heide, J. B., and G. John. 1990. Alliances in industrial purchasing: The
determinants of joint action in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal
of Marketing Research 27 (February): 24–36.
Helfat, C. E., and R. S. Raubitschek. 2000. Product sequencing: Co-
evolution of knowledge, capabilities and products. Strategic Man-
agement Journal 21 (10/11): 961–79.
Henard, D. H., and D. M. Szymanski. 2001. Why some new products are more
successful than others. Journal of Marketing Research 38 (3): 362–75.
Himmelmann, A., and D. Schiereck. 2009. R&D progress and stock
return—Evidence from the pharmaceutical and biotech industry. Paper
presented at the CFF Research Conference, Vallendar, Germany.
Hitt, M. A., M. T. Dacin, E. Levitas, J Arregle, and A. Borza. 2000.
Partner selection in emerging and developed market contexts:
Resource-based organizational learning perspectives. Academy of
Management Journal 43 (3): 449–67.
Hoang, H., and F. T. Rothaermel. 2005. The effect of general and
partner-specific alliance experience on joint R&D project perform-
ance. Academy of Management Journal 48 (2): 332–45.
Hoenig, D., and J. Henkel. 2015. Quality signals? The role of patents,
alliances, and team experience in venture capital financing.
Research Policy 44 (5): 1049–64.
Holmqvist, M. 2003. A dynamic model of intra-and interorganizational
learning. Organization Studies 24 (1): 95–123.
Hu, Y., P. McNamara, and D. McLoughlin. 2015. Outbound open innovation
in bio-pharmaceutical out-licensing. Technovation 35 (January): 46–58.
Ilmola, L., and O. Kuusi. 2006. Filters of weak signals hinder foresight:
Monitoring weak signals efficiently in corporate decision-making.
Futures 38 (8): 908–24.
Janney, J. J., and T. B. Folta. 2003. Signaling through private equity
placements and its impact on the valuation of biotechnology firms.
Journal of Business Venturing 18 (3): 361–80.
Johnstone, R. A., and A. Grafen. 1993. Dishonesty and the handicap
principle. Animal Behaviour 46 (4): 759–64.
Katila, R., and G. Ahuja. 2002. Something old, something new: A lon-
gitudinal study of search behavior and new product introduction.
Academy of Management Journal 45 (6): 1183–94.
Katila, R., J. D. Rosenberger, and K. M. Eisenhardt. 2008. Swimming
with sharks: Technology ventures, defense mechanisms and corporate
relationships. Administrative Science Quarterly 53 (2): 295–332.
Kellogg, D., and J. M. Charnes. 2000. Real-options valuation for a bio-
technology company. Financial Analysts Journal 56 (3): 76–84.
Kelley, D. J., and M. P. Rice. 2002. Advantage beyond founding: The strate-
gic use of technologies. Journal of Business Venturing 17 (1): 41–57.
Kester, L., E. J. Hultink, and A. Griffin. 2014. An empirical investiga-
tion of the antecedents and outcomes of NPD portfolio success.
Journal of Product Innovation Management 31 (6): 1199–1213.
Kirmani, A., and A. R. Rao. 2000. No pain, no gain: A critical review
of the literature on signaling unobservable product quality. Journal
of Marketing 64 (2): 66–79.
Lant, T. K., and D. B. Montgomery. 1987. Learning from strategic suc-
cess and failure. Journal of Business Research 15 (6): 503–17.
Lee, J. 2011. The alignment of contract terms for knowledge-creating
and knowledge-appropriating relationship portfolios. Journal of
Marketing 75 (July): 110–27.
Lee, R. P., and Q. Chen. 2009. The immediate impact of new product
introductions on stock price: The role of firm resources and size.
Journal of Product Innovation Management 26 (1): 97–107.
Lee, I., and S. B. Wyatt. 1990. The effects of international joint ven-
tures on shareholder wealth. Financial Review 25 (4): 641–49.
Lester, R. H., S. T. Certo, C. M. Dalton, D. R. Dalton, and A. A.
Cannella. 2006. Initial public offering investor valuations: An exam-
ination of top management team prestige and environmental uncer-
tainty. Journal of Small Business Management 44 (1): 1–26.
Levitas, E., and M. A. McFadyen. 2009. Managing liquidity in research-
intensive firms: Signaling and cash flow effects of patents and alli-
ance activities. Strategic Management Journal 30 (6): 659–78.
Liberman, N., and Y. Trope. 1998. The role of feasibility and desirabil-
ity considerations in near and distant future decisions: A test of
temporal construal theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 75 (1): 5–18.
Lokshin, B., J. Hagedoorn, and W. Letterie. 2011. The bumpy road of
technological partnerships: Understanding causes and consequences
of partnership mal-functioning. Research Policy 40 (2): 297–308.
Lubatkin, M., J. Florin, and P. Lane. 2001. Learning together and apart:
A model of reciprocal interfirm learning. Human Relations 54 (10):
1353–82.
Makhija, M. V., and U. Ganesh. 1997. The relationship between control
and partner learning in learning-related joint ventures. Organization
Science 8 (5): 508–27.
March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learn-
ing. Organization Science 2 (1): 1–87.
McConnell, J. J., and T. J. Nantell. 1985. Corporate combinations and
common stock returns: The case of joint ventures. Journal of
Finance 40 (2): 519–36.
McNally, R. C., B. Akdeniz, and R. J. Calantone. 2011. New product
development processes and new product profitability: The mediating
role of speed to market and product quality. Journal of Product
Innovation Management 28 (S1): 63–77.
McNamara, P., and C. Baden-Fuller, 1999. Lessons from the Celltech
case: Balancing knowledge exploration and exploitation in organiza-
tional renewal. British Journal of Management 10 (4): 291–307.
McWilliams, A., and D. Siegel. 1997. Event studies in management
research: Theoretical and empirical issues. Academy of Management
Journal 40 (3): 626–57.
Merchant, H., and D. Schendel. 2000. How do international joint ventures cre-
ate shareholder value. Strategic Management Journal 21 (7): 723–37.
Mitchell, T. R., L. Thompson, E. Peterson, and R. Cronc. 1997. Tempo-
ral adjustments in the evaluation of events: The “rosy view.” Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology 33 (4): 421–48.
Montoya-Weiss, M. M., and R. Calantone. 1994. Determinants of new
product performance: A review and metaanalysis. Journal of Prod-
uct and Innovation Management 11 (5): 397–417.
Moran, M. 2003. Cost of bringing new drugs to market rising rapidly.
Psychiatric News 38 (15): 25.
Nohria, N., and R. Gulati. 1996. Is slack good or bad for innovation?
Academy of Management Journal 39 (5): 1245–64.
€Onc€uler, A. 2010. How do we manage an uncertain future? Ambiguity
today is not ambiguity tomorrow. In The irrational economist: Mak-
ing decisions in a dangerous world, ed. E. Michel-Kerjan and
P. Slovic, 107–15. New York: Public Affairs.
Orlikowski, W. J., and J. Yates. 2002. It’s about time: Temporal struc-
turing in organizations. Organization Science 13 (6): 684–700.
Ortiz-Molina, H. 2006. Top management incentives and the pricing of
corporate public debt. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analy-
sis 41 (2): 317–40.
Ozcan, S., and M. L. Overby. 2008. A cognitive model of stock market
reactions to multi-firm alliance announcements. Strategic Organiza-
tion 6 (4): 435–69.
Park, N. K. 2004. A guide to using event study methods in multi-
country settings. Strategic Management Journal 25 (7): 655–68.
24 J PROD INNOV MANAG
2016;00(00):00–00
Y. HU ET AL.
Park, N. K., and J. M. Mezias. 2005. Before and after the technology
sector crash: The effect of environmental munificence on stock mar-
ket response to alliances of e-commerce firms. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 26 (11): 987–1107.
PhRMA. 2010. Pharmaceutical industry profile 2010. Washington, DC:
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.
Pisano, G. P. 1990. The R&D boundaries of the firm: An empirical
analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1): 153–76.
Porter, M. E. 1998. Cluster and the new economics of competition.
Harvard Business Review 76 (6): 77–90.
Rasmussen, B. 2010. Innovation and commercialization in the biopharma-
ceutical sector: Creating and capturing value. London: Edward Elgar.
Rao, A. R., Q. Lu, and R. Ruekert. 1999. Signaling unobservable product qual-
ity through a brand ally. Journal of Marketing Research 36 (2): 258–68.
Rao, R. S., R. K. Chandy, and J. C. Prabhu. 2008. The fruits of legiti-
macy: Why some new ventures gain more from innovation than
others. Journal of Marketing 72 (4): 58–75.
Reuer, J. J., and M. P. Koza. 2000. Asymmetric information and joint ven-
ture performance: Theory and evidence for domestic and international
joint ventures. Strategic Management Journal 21 (1): 81–88.
Robertson, T. S., J. Eliashberg, and T. Rymon. 1995. New product
announcement signals and incumbent reactions. Journal of Market-
ing 59 (July): 1–15.
Rothaermel, F. T. 2002. Technological discontinuities and interfirm coop-
eration: What determines a startup’s attractiveness as alliance partner?
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 49 (4): 388–97.
Rothaermel, F. T., and D. L. Deeds. 2004. Exploration and exploitation
alliances in biotechnology: A system of new product development.
Strategic Management Journal 25 (3): 201–21.
Rothaermel, F. T., and D. L. Deeds. 2006. Alliance type, alliance expe-
rience and alliance management capability in high-technology ven-
tures. Journal of Business Venturing 21 (4): 429–60.
Sampson, R. C. 2005. Experience effects and collaborative returns in
R&D alliances. Strategic Management Journal 26: 1009–1031.
Sanders, W. G., and S. Boivie. 2004. Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms
in uncertain markets. Strategic Management Journal 25 (2): 167–86.
Sarkar, S. K., and P. J. De Jong. 2006. Market response to FDA announce-
ments. Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance 46 (4): 586–97.
Schilling, M. A. 1998. Technological lockout: An integrative model of
the economic and strategic factors driving technology success and
failure. Academy of Management Review 23 (2): 267–84.
Shane, S., and T. Stuart. 2002. Organizational endowments and the per-
formance of university start-ups. Management Science 48 (1): 154–70.
Sharma, A., and N. Lacey, 2004. Linking product development out-
comes to market valuation of the firm: The case of the US pharma-
ceutical industry. Journal of Product Innovation Management 21
(5): 297–308.
Shepherd, D. A. 2003. Learning from business failure: Propositions of
grief recovery for the self-employed. Academy of Management
Review 28 (2): 318–28.
Shepherd, D. A., and M. S. Cardon. 2009. Negative emotional reactions
to project failure and the self-compassion to learn from the experi-
ence. Journal of Management Studies 46 (6): 923–49.
Shepherd, D. A., J. G. Calantone, and D. F. Kuratko. 2009. Project fail-
ure from corporate entrepreneurship: Managing the grief process.
Journal of Business Venturing 24 (6): 588–600.
Shepherd, D. A., H. Patzelt, T. A. Williams, and D. Warnecke. 2014.
How does project termination impact project team members? Rapid
termination, “creeping death,” and learning from failure. Journal of
Management Studies 51 (4): 513–546.
Smith-Doerr, L., I. M. Manev, and P. Rizova. 2004. The meaning of
success: Network position and the social construction of project out-
comes in an R&D lab. Journal of Engineering and Technology
Management 21 (1): 51–81.
Sood, A, and G. J. Tellis, 2009. Do innovations really pay off? Total stock
market returns to innovation.Marketing Science 28 (3): 442–56.
Spence, M. 1973. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics
87 (3): 355–74.
Spence, M. 2002. Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure
of markets. American Economic Review 92 (3): 434–59.
StataCorp. 2007. Stata statistical software: Release 10.0 (10 ed.). Col-
lege Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
Stuart, T. E. 2000. Interorganizational alliances and the performance of
firms: A study of growth and innovation rates in high technology
industry. Strategic Management Journal 21 (8): 791–811.
Stuart, T. E., H. Hoang, and R. Hybel. 1999. Interorganizational
endorsements and the performance of entrepreneurial ventures.
Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (2): 315–50.
Su, P., and P. McNamara. 2012. Exploration and exploitation within
and across intra-organisational domains and their reactions to firm-
level failure. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 24
(2): 129–49.
Swaminathan, V., and C. Moorman. 2009. Marketing alliances, firm net-
works, and firm value creation. Journal of Marketing 73 (Septem-
ber): 52–69.
Tellis, G. J. 2012. Unrelenting innovation: How to create a culture for
market dominance. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons.
Terwiesch, C., C. Loch, and M. Niederkofler. 1998. When product
development performance makes a difference: A statistical analysis
in the electronics industry. Journal of Product Innovation Manage-
ment 15 (1): 3–15.
Trope, Y., and N. Liberman. 2003. Temporal construal. Psychological
Review 110 (3): 403–21.
Urbig, D., R. B€urger, H. Patzelt, and L. Schweizer. 2013. Investor reac-
tions to new product development failures: The moderating role of
product development stage. Journal of Management 39 (4): 985–
1015.
Van de Ven, A. H., D. Polley, R. Garud, and S. Venkataraman. 1999.
The innovation journey. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vernon, J., J. Golec, and J. DiMasi. 2010. Drug development costs
when financial risk is measured using the Fama-French three-factor
model. Health Economics Letters 19 (8): 1002–5.
von Hippel, E. 1978. Successful industrial products from customer
ideas. The Journal of Marketing 42 (1): 39–49.
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Man-
agement Journal 5 (2): 171–80.
Wheelwright, S. C., and K. B. Clark. 1992. Revolutionizing product
development: Quantum leaps in speed, efficiency, and quality. New
York: The Free Press.
Wuyts, S., S. Dutta, and S. Stremersch. 2004. Portfolios of interfirm
agreements in technology-intensive markets: Consequences for inno-
vation and profitability. Journal of Marketing 68 (April): 88–100.
Yamakawa, Y., H. Yang, and Z. Lin. 2011. Exploration versus exploita-
tion in alliance portfolio: Performance implications of organizational,
strategic, and environmental fit. Research Policy 40 (2): 287–96.
Yang, H., Y. Zheng, and X. Zhao. 2014. Exploration or exploitation?
Small firms’ alliance strategies with large firms. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal 35 (1): 146–57.
Zheng, Y., J. Liu, and G. George. 2010. The dynamic impact of innova-
tive capability and inter-firm network on firm valuation: A longitu-
dinal study of biotechnology start-ups. Journal of Business
Venturing 25 (6): 593–609.
PROJECT SUSPENSIONS AND FAILURES IN NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT J PROD INNOV MANAG
2016;00(00):00–00
25
View publication stats
